LA Ramparts Scandle

rampart scandal timeline
kevin gaines March 18, 1997 – Road Rage ShootoutUndercover L.A.P.D. officer Frank Lyga shot and killed off-duty L.A.P.D. officer Kevin Gaines in a case of apparent road rage. The shooting of a black officer — Gaines — by a white cop — Lyga — created a highly publicized police controversy. Lyga told FRONTLINE that Gaines threatened him with a gun and that he responded in self-defense, adding, “In my training experience this guy had ‘I’m a gang member’ written all over him.” Investigators on the case discovered that Gaines had allegedly been involved in similar road rage incidents, threatening drivers and brandishing his gun. They also discovered troubling connections between Gaines and Death Row Records, a rap recording label owned by Marion “Suge” Knight that, investigators came to find, was hiring off-duty police officers as security guards.

Lyga, who had been reassigned to desk duty while the L.A.P.D. reviewed the circumstances of the shooting, including whether his actions had been racially motivated, was ultimately exonerated a year later. Three separate internal investigations determined that the shooting was “in policy.”

After the shooting, the Gaines family, represented by attorney Johnnie Cochran, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the city of Los Angeles for $25 million. The city later settled the suit for $250,000.

November 6, 1997 – Bank Robbery

Robbers targeted a Los Angeles branch of Bank of America, making off with $722,000. Investigating officers were immediately suspicious of assistant bank manager Errolyn Romero, who had had more cash than was necessary delivered just ten minutes before the robbery. One month later Romero confessed to her role in the crime and implicated her boyfriend, L.A.P.D. officer David Mack, as the mastermind. A former track star, Mack was arrested and later convicted of the bank robbery. He was sentenced to 14 years and three months in federal prison. He has refused to reveal the whereabouts of the money, and while in prison has reportedly associated himself with the Mob Piru Bloods, a gang with ties to Death Row Records. Detectives investigating Mack discovered that two days after the robbery, Mack and two other police officers — including a former partner, Rafael Perez — spent the weekend gambling in Las Vegas, spending thousands of dollars.

February 26, 1998 — Station-House Beating

L.A.P.D. Officer Brian Hewitt, a member of L.A.P.D.’s elite anti–gang unit CRASH [Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums] in the Rampart division, brought 18th Street gang member Ismael Jimenez to the Rampart police station for questioning. Hewitt allegedly beat the hand-cuffed Jimenez in the chest and stomach, causing him to vomit blood. After being released, Jimenez went to the hospital, where officials notified the L.A.P.D. of his injuries and complaints. Subsequent internal investigations resulted in the firing of Hewitt and another officer, Ethan Cohan, who, the Department determined, knew about but failed to report the beating. Jimenez, who was awarded $231,000 in a civil settlement with the city, is currently in federal custody pending a multiple count indictment for the distribution of drugs and conspiracy to commit murder.

March 27, 1998 — Missing Cocaine

Officials in the L.A.P.D. property room discovered that six pounds of cocaine evidence are missing. Within a week, detectives focused their investigation on L.A.P.D. officer Rafael Perez, a member of the Rampart CRASH unit.

May 1998 — Task Force Created

Concerned about a possible clique of officers involved in criminal misconduct — working off-duty for Death Row Records, robbing banks and stealing cocaine — L.A.P.D. Chief Bernard Parks established an internal investigative task force. The investigative team, later named the Rampart Corruption Task Force, focused primarily on the prosecution of Rafael Perez. Further audit of the L.A.P.D. property room identified another pound of missing cocaine — evidence that had been booked on a prior arrest made by Det. Frank Lyga, the officer who had shot Kevin Gaines. At the time, investigators speculated that Perez may have stolen the cocaine booked by Lyga in retaliation for the shooting of Gaines.

August 25, 1998 — Perez Arrested

When first stopped and arrested by detectives, Perez asked, “Is this about the bank robbery?” It wasn’t. It was about the 6 pounds of missing cocaine, which investigators believed had been checked out by Perez, under another officer’s name, and sold on the streets of Rampart through a girlfriend.

In December, Perez was brought to trial on charges of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, grand theft and forgery. After five days of deliberations, the jury announced that it was hopelessly deadlocked, with a final vote of 8-4 favoring conviction.

In preparing to bolster their case for a retrial, investigators discovered an additional eleven instances of suspicious cocaine transfers. Detectives were able to identify dope “switches,” where Perez had ordered the cocaine evidence out of property and replaced it with Bisquick.

September 8, 1999 — Perez Cuts a Deal

Rafael Perez made a deal with prosecutors under which he pled guilty to cocaine theft and agreed to provide prosecutors with information about two “bad” shootings and three other Rampart CRASH officers involved in illegal activity. In exchange, Perez received a five-year prison sentence and immunity from further prosecution of misconduct short of murder.

Among his first revelations, Perez told investigators of how he and his partner Nino Durden had shot, framed, and testified against Javier Ovando, an unarmed gang member who was left paralyzed as a result of the incident. At the time of Perez’s admission, Ovando was in jail, serving the 23 year sentence he had received for allegedly assaulting the two officers.

Thus began a nine-month confessional during which time Perez met with investigators more than 50 times and provided more than 4,000 pages in sworn testimony. Before he was done, Perez implicated about 70 officers in misconduct, from bad shootings to drinking beer on the job.

photo of javier ovando September 16, 1999 — Ovando Released

With Perez recanting his 1996 testimony about the shooting of Javier Ovando, the District Attorney’s Office filed a writ of habeus corpus seeking to overturn his conviction. Ovando was released from prison after serving two and a half years.

Based upon Perez’s allegations of wrongful arrests, and investigations by the Task Force, nearly 100 more convictions were eventually overturned.

September 21, 1999 — Board of Inquiry

L.A.P.D. chief Bernard Parks formed a Board of Inquiry comprised of L.A.P.D. command staff to analyze management failures and investigate the depth of the corruption scandal. The Board’s report, released in March 2000, blames, in large measure, lax departmental management for allowing misconduct within the Rampart Division to occur. The report offers 108 recommendations, including the improvement of hiring practices, supervisory oversight and police training.

March 3, 2000 — CRASH Disbanded

L.A.P.D. chief Bernard Parks announced that he was disbanding the department’s CRASH units and creating new anti-gang details that that would include more rigorous requirements for membership, stressing the officers’ level of experience.

April 2000 — Police Commission Review

The Police Commission formed the Rampart Independent Review Panel, comprised of citizens including attorneys, educators, and business executives. The panel issued a report in November 2000 with 72 findings and 86 recommendations. It concluded that officers need better and more supervision; that the department compromises criminal investigations of officer-involved shootings and major use-of-force incidents; and that the L.A.P.D. is viewed by the community as excessively hostile and confrontational.

July 28, 2000 — Perez’s Partner Arrested for Ovando Shooting

Perez’s partner Nino Durden was arrested and charged with attempted murder for the shooting of Javier Ovando. He was also charged with perjury, filing false police reports and robbery. He pleaded innocent to all charges in November 2000.

September 11, 2000 — Independent Report Critical of L.A.P.D.’s Handling of Scandal

Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of Southern California, released an analysis of the L.A.P.D.’s Board of Inquiry report which he prepared at the request of the Police Protective League. He concluded that the L.A.P.D. minimized the magnitude of the Rampart scandal and failed to acknowledge the extent to which its internal culture allowed corruption to fester. Chemerinsky’s report recommends more aggressive independent reviews and a permanent special prosecutor to investigate police misconduct.

September 19, 2000 — Feds Take Over L.A.P.D.

The Los Angeles City Council voted 10 to 2 to accept a consent decree allowing a federal judge acting on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice to oversee and monitor reforms within the L.A.P.D. for a period of five years. In agreeing to the consent decree, the Justice Department — which had been investigating the L.A.P.D. since 1996 for excessive force violations — agreed not to pursue a civil rights lawsuit against the city. Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan and L.A.P.D. Chief Bernard Parks initially opposed the consent decree, but backed down when it became clear that it was supported by the city council. Riordan signed the consent decree in November 2000.

September 26, 2000 — Whistleblower Files Lawsuit Charging Cover Up

Former L.A.P.D. detective Russell Poole filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the city of Los Angeles and L.A.P.D. Chief Bernard Parks. Poole, a detective with the Robbery/Homicide Division, was a lead investigator on the Lyga-Gaines shooting and was later assigned to the Rampart Corruption Task Force, where he investigated the station-house beating of Ismael Jimenez. Poole resigned from the Department after 18 years and claims in his civil suit that Chief Parks shut down his efforts to fully investigate the extent of corruption within the Department, including possible criminal activities of Kevin Gaines and David Mack, as well as the breadth of officer misconduct within Rampart. Chief Parks has denied Poole’s allegations in the lawsuit, calling them “totally false.”

October 4, 2000 — Three CRASH Cops Convicted

In the first criminal case stemming from Perez’s allegations, Sgt. Edward Ortiz, Brian Liddy, Paul Harper and Michael Buchanan, all of the Rampart CRASH unit, were tried on charges of perjury, fabricating arrests and filing false police reports. Perez did not testify at the trial, due to concerns about his credibility. All four officers pleaded not guilty. On November 15, 2000, Ortiz, Liddy and Buchanan were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice and filing false police reports, while Harper was acquitted of all charges.

November 21, 2000 — Record Settlement Reached

In the largest police misconduct settlement in city history, Javier Ovando was awarded $15 million. An additional 29 civil suits were settled for nearly $11 million. The city, faced with more than 140 civil suits stemming from the corruption scandal, estimates that total settlement costs will be about $125 million.

Four months after his settlement, Ovando was arrested in Nevada and charged with the possession and trafficking of drugs.

December 22, 2000 — CRASH Cop Convictions Overturned

After a series of hearings investigating allegations of juror misconduct, Superior Court Judge Jacqueline Connor overturned the convictions of Rampart CRASH cops Ortiz, Liddy and Buchanan. Judge Connor called the verdict unfair because in post-trial interviews the jurors disclosed that they had determined guilt based on a reporting issue not raised in the trial. In January 2001, the new D.A., Steve Cooley, announced that he would appeal Judge Connor’s decision.

March 23, 2001 — Three More CRASH Cops Indicted; Two Plead Out

The District Attorney’s office brought felony indictments against three former Rampart CRASH officers: Ethan Cohan, Manuel Chavez and Shawn Gomez. The complaints charge the officers with assaulting two gang members and filing false police reports. Chavez and Gomez have reached plea agreements, including cooperation with prosecutors. Cohan has pleaded innocent and awaits trial.

March 30, 2001 — Perez’s Partner Pleads Guilty

Perez’s former partner Nino Durden cut a deal with state and federal prosecutors in which he agreed to plead guilty to ten state and federal charges, including fabricating evidence, false arrest and presenting false testimony. Durden is expected to receive a prison sentence of 7-8 years, and the deal requires that he fully cooperate with federal prosecutors, who, using Durden’s testimony, may bring additional indictments against Rafael Perez.

July 24, 2001 — Perez Released

After serving three years of his five-year sentence, Rafael Perez was released from prison and placed on parole. Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert Perry ruled that due to safety concerns, Perez could serve his parole outside the state of California.

December 17, 2001 — Perez Pleads Guilty to Federal Charges

Perez pled guilty to federal civil rights and firearms violations resulting from the shooting of Javier Ovando. He admitted to one count of conspiracy to violate Ovando’s civil rights, and one count of possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number. He is scheduled for sentencing in March 2002, and is expected to serve two years in federal prison under the plea agreement.

A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia

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27-34 minutes

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Nadège Rolland

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, many Western observers of Sino-Russian relations dismiss the current level of cooperation and engagement between the two powers as nothing more than a convenient façade hiding profound mutual mistrust and suspicions. The long list of supposedly irreconcilable contradictions separating Beijing and Moscow includes lingering historical grievances, a glaring demographic imbalance and a growing power asymmetry that exacerbates Russia’s insecurities. As its own power declines, Russia is presumed to be bitter and resentful of China’s rising economic, political and military capabilities, and its increased presence in areas that Moscow still covets as its exclusive sphere of influence. Surely, a Russia proud of its glorious past must resent being relegated to the role of little brother by a fast-rising China. Material and economic interests may currently be pushing Moscow and Beijing into each other’s arms, but other factors such as prestige and a yawning power disparity will eventually pull them apart. The recent closeness in relations between the two powers, evident especially since 2014, is therefore widely assumed to be a marriage of convenience, based on fragile common interests, that will not last.¹

For the moment, however, the evidence points to an increasingly deep condominium between the two powers. French writer Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said that ‘love does not consist in looking at one another, but in looking together in the same direction’. China and Russia are certainly looking together in the same direction with equal yearning towards Eurasia. Both powers perceive the Western presence on opposite sides of the Eurasian landmass – US alliances and presence in East Asia for China; NATO and the European Union’s normative power for Russia – as threatening to contain and ultimately undermine them. Both continental powers consider Eurasia their strategic backyard, and both have launched ambitious initiatives to strengthen their influence over the region: the Eurasian Economic Union and the Greater Eurasian Partnership for Russia, the Silk Road Economic Belt – the land component of the Belt and Road Initiative – for China. But their common focus does not mean they are necessarily competing against each other in this vast continental space. Rather, China and Russia share similar concerns about Eurasia’s political stability and security, and similar overall objectives regarding what a future regional order should look like.

Chinese strategists are clear-eyed about Russia’s regional ambitions and pursuit of prestige, its concerns about China’s strategic intent, and its uneasiness with the growing power imbalance. At the same time, they are aware that Beijing’s own regional supremacy cannot be achieved if Russia is antagonised and stands in the way. Chinese strategists thus advocate a low-friction path, prudently working on ways to assuage Moscow’s fears while taking advantage of its current isolation and lack of alternative options. They hope that a concerted effort might enable the two strategic partners to avoid the rise of bilateral tensions and discord, while helping both to achieve their regional objectives. As one top Chinese diplomat put it, Eurasia is the main region where China must work hand in hand with Russia to ‘seek convergence and a balance of interests’ and align both countries’ Eurasian grand strategies.²

Visible between the lines of Chinese assessments, however, is the expectation that the accommodation of Russia’s needs and fears will only be a transitional phase during which China needs to bide its time: in the long run, Russia will have become a toothless former superpower, surrendering the stage for Beijing to fully assert its own influence over Eurasia.

The Eurasian landmass is the primary focus of regional integration initiatives launched by both Russia and China in recent years.³ The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which emerged first as a customs union in 2011 and then as an economic union in 2015, now includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan alongside Russia. Supported since 2012 by a common supranational institution, the Eurasian Economic Commission, and a treaty signed in 2014, the EAEU’s primary objective is to create a single market for goods, services, capital and labour, a first step toward deeper integration of the post-Soviet space, akin to the European Union.⁴

With the EAEU integration process already under way, a group of Russian experts led by Sergei Karaganov gathered under the aegis of the Valdai Club (most probably on commission from the Russian government)⁵ to brainstorm about further options for Eurasia’s integration. In April 2015, the group published a report entitled ‘Towards the Great Ocean’ that advocated the transformation of Eurasia into a Sino-Russian zone of joint development. During a visit that month to the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS),⁶ Karaganov announced that his ‘Greater Eurasia’ plan had been submitted to Russian President Vladimir Putin.⁷ He apparently liked the idea: at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum held in June 2016, Putin proposed building a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ (GEP) that would include the EAEU and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, in addition to China, India, Pakistan and Iran.

The extension of the new partnership’s geographic scope to a greater Eurasian region beyond the post-Soviet space reflects the Russian political establishment’s acknowledgement that in order to bring economic prosperity to the region, a narrowly focused EAEU will probably not be sufficient. The big Asian economic engines must be engaged.⁸  The launch of the GEP is also intended to create the impression that Moscow is still the leading force driving the region’s integration process, as it increasingly feels the pressure of another vision for Eurasia’s future: China’s new Silk Road project.

What is now known as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) was launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The BRI comprises two main parts: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), stretching from China to Western Europe, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that extends from China through the Indian Ocean towards the Mediterranean Sea. Generally perceived as a cross-border infrastructure-development project, the BRI is in fact a reflection of the Beijing political elite’s vision for a broader, integrated Eurasian region helmed by China.⁹ The five main links promoted by the BRI – policy coordination, infrastructure construction, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges – serve the ultimate objective of building a ‘community of shared destiny for mankind’, a phrase that carries a clear revisionist subtext.¹⁰ Compared with the Russian EAEU and GEP, the BRI’s main appeal is the amount of money Beijing is willing to inject into various projects. The BRI is presented as inclusive, and the majority of Russia’s closest neighbours have enthusiastically joined China’s initiative.

Two powers vying for the same space with two different projects might seem like a formula for growing friction and even conflict. In fact, the opposite is happening. Aware of the high risk of geopolitical rivalry, both China and Russia have demonstrated remarkable consistency in trying to avoid competition and to develop instead a cooperative framework that allows for an alignment of their respective flagship Eurasian initiatives.

The first sign of Russia and China’s shared willingness to work hand in hand came during the Putin–Xi summit in Moscow in May 2015. The two leaders signed a joint declaration on ‘cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union project and the Silk Road Economic Belt’, which pledged to strengthen regional economic integration and ‘safeguard peace and stability on the Eurasian landmass’.¹¹ Investments, transportation-infrastructure development and, over the long run, a free-trade agreement between the EAEU and China were envisioned as ways to enhance the region’s economic development. A dialogue platform was also created to look into concrete measures to better merge the EAEU and the SREB, an idea expressed as duì jiē (对接) – ‘docking’ or ‘joining in’ – in Chinese, and sopryazhenie (сопряжение) – ‘pairing’ or ‘coupling’ – in Russian.

During the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on 25 June 2016, Xi and Putin reiterated their commitment to aligning their interests in Eurasia and promoted the idea of building a ‘comprehensive Eurasian partnership on the basis of openness, transparency and the consideration of other’s benefits [sic]’.¹² In July 2017, the same day Putin and Xi formally agreed to deepen their bilateral ‘Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation Relationship’, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development set up a task force to study the feasibility of a joint Eurasian Economic Partnership.¹³ During the ensuing bilateral consultations, Russian and Chinese experts reached a consensus on observing the principles of ‘sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs’, and respecting each other’s ‘chosen path of development’.¹⁴

In addition to presidential meetings and formal joint declarations, both countries have developed an ‘outstanding mechanism’ for regular consultations that functions at every level, ‘from meetings between heads of state and government ministers downward’.¹⁵ The high-level Sino-Russian political commitment to cooperate in Eurasia seeps down to both countries’ intellectual elites, which have been mobilised to provide recommendations on the feasibility of a BRI–GEP integration. For example, the Russian International Affairs Council is promoting research focused on the GEP,¹⁶ while the Chinese government funds a national grant for the project ‘Study of the Docking Path and the Growing Trends of Belt and Road and Greater Eurasian Partnership Initiatives’. Both Russian and Chinese analysts tend to see the two projects’ differences not as irremediable obstacles, but as mutually complementing and strengthening factors.

Chinese Russia experts share similarities with Western China experts: they are language-proficient, and have an in-depth knowledge of the political system, history and strategic culture of their geographical area of specialisation. In most cases, they have spent several years locally as students or in a professional capacity as academics or public servants. When they conduct research on Russia’s international posture to advise the Chinese political leadership, they usually revert to the same methodology as the one Western China experts use to examine China’s foreign policy. That is, they scrutinise internal debates; pay attention to the leadership’s official rhetoric, statements and agreements; and read and analyse op-eds and more extensive analyses by local counterparts they have identified as domestically influential, with whom they interact on a regular basis during study trips, dialogues and seminars. They then publish their research findings and analysis, usually including policy recommendations for China’s decision-makers.

When Chinese experts examine Russian perspectives on Eurasia, they observe an expressed willingness to find common interests and to work cooperatively with China. At least in their public commentary, Russian analysts tend to understand China’s BRI not as a geopolitical grand strategy but primarily as an economically and domestically oriented project.¹⁷ Some dismiss it as a disparate bundle that lacks a clearly stated goal, performance criteria or time frame, one that is marred by ‘uncertainty and lack of focus’. Proponents of this view scoff at geostrategic readings of the BRI that they believe reflect a lack of understanding of ‘the wide range of opinions and approaches toward this initiative within China’.¹⁸ Other experts believe that the BRI might prove to be a useful instrument for serving Moscow’s objectives. At a time when Russia faces serious economic difficulties and lacks the financial power to pursue some of its own priorities, the BRI may be able to provide support for the development of regional infrastructure, accelerate Eurasia’s regional integration at lower economic cost for Russia, strengthen the EAEU’s position as an intermediary between Asia and Europe, and counterbalance the negative geopolitical implications of economic mega-blocs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.¹⁹

These statements suggest that China’s external propaganda campaign, which portrays the BRI as a generous gift to promote regional economic prosperity and places the emphasis on benefits for participating countries, has thus far been effective in shaping Russian perceptions. In this sense, Russia is no different than Western countries that tend to be oblivious to the geostrategic nature of the BRI and prefer to focus on the possible avenues of cooperation with China. Given that Russian experts claim to believe that there is no well-calculated and informed strategy behind the BRI, it is unsurprising that the Kremlin has decided to coordinate its Eurasian efforts with Beijing. It is, of course, possible that some in Moscow perceive potential risks from the BRI but see no viable option at present for opposing it. Whatever the case, Russia seems inclined to play along, at least for now, and China is doing everything possible to ensure that it continues to do so.

For their part, Chinese experts see Russia’s attempt to promote regional economic integration via the EAEU as part of a ‘geoeconomic’ strategy that ultimately aims at restoring the unified economic, political and security space of the former Soviet Union, albeit in a modern form.²⁰ Russia’s decision to look to the East is attributed to a series of disappointments with the West that have accumulated since the end of the Cold War, with the post-Ukraine sanctions being only the latest iteration. Moscow’s faith in what the West could bring ‘turned out to be wishful thinking’, as Russia received ‘no more than lip service while [it] was in extreme economic difficulties’ in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²¹ In addition, according to Chinese officials and analysts, the American post-Cold War charm offensive towards the CIS was a ‘squeeze strategy’ designed to weaken Russia, while the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme constituted European encroachment into the post-Soviet space that did not even involve consultation with Russia.²² The eastward expansions of the EU and NATO represented a mortal danger to Russia, especially as they attempted to ‘lure, threaten or even interfere in internal affairs (such as inciting and planning color revolutions)’.²³ The 2014 Ukrainian crisis irrevocably pushed Moscow to shift its focus from Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia.²⁴ But Russia’s turn to the East is not only the ‘inevitable result of the US and EU geopolitical game’;²⁵ it is also the logical consequence of the gravity shift towards an increasingly politically and economically powerful Asia-Pacific, which provides Russia with tremendous ‘cooperation and development opportunities’.²⁶ Seeing both Western hostility and the rise of Asia as deep and fundamental developments, Chinese thinkers seem confident that the trends are working in China’s favour.

Russia seems inclined to play along

Chinese experts caution that Moscow could perceive the BRI as potentially damaging to Russia’s interests in its near abroad. They are aware that the growing Sino-Russian asymmetry of power and influence, especially visible in Central Asia, may cause some problems for a Russia that clings jealously to its big-brother status. Jiao Yiqiang, a Central Asia specialist, underlines in particular Russia’s possible concerns that the BRI could be used as a tool to help turn China’s economic clout into political influence, thereby weakening Russia’s position and ultimately subordinating it in its own traditional sphere of influence: ‘Russia is worried that China will surpass its influence and thus hinder its status and role as great power.’²⁷ Nevertheless, Jiao insists that Chinese and Russian interests are fundamentally similar. Likewise, Yang Lei, the director of the Zhou Enlai School of Government’s Eurasian Research Center, notes that the consistencies between the BRI and the GEP are greater than the differences: economically, both aim at promoting the development of a Eurasian transportation corridor, leading to integration via infrastructure and trade. Geopolitically, although some potential conflicts do exist, they are not serious enough to affect the overall bilateral cooperation in the foreseeable future.  In the long term, however, ‘when the integration process has reached a certain stage’, Yang cautions that the ‘issue of limiting Russia’s hegemonic ambitions will have to be considered’.²⁸

In the end, Chinese analysts argue, the immediate danger for Russia is not China, but the old international order dominated by Western countries. Notwithstanding recent shifts in US policy, which some Western observers see as weakening the existing Western-led order, Chinese analysts believe that order continues to constitute a common challenge to both countries and is ‘undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to the rejuvenation of China and Russia’.²⁹ In Eurasia, Moscow and Beijing are keen on expanding their economic cooperation, seen as a prerequisite for social and political stability. Ultimately, a ‘safe and stable Central Asia is a common interest’.³⁰ In the security domain too, both countries can multiply their advantages against a common adversary if they work together and carry out security cooperation under the GEP framework. Working together would enable them to ‘jointly safeguard peace and stability’ and ‘curb the [United States’] new interventionism’.³¹

Chinese assessments of Russia’s motives and insecurities are thus not dissimilar to Western ones. But where Western analysts usually conclude that a Sino-Russian collision is inevitable, their Chinese counterparts see complementarity and opportunities to work together towards the realisation of shared objectives.

Aware of Moscow’s sensitivities, China treads carefully. Chinese experts interpret the GEP as Russia’s struggle to maintain its image as a key strategic actor in Eurasia, playing the leading role in the region’s integration process. China nurtures similar ambitions with the BRI, but does not say so as straightforwardly. Like Moscow, Beijing hopes to see a new Eurasian order emerge, free of Western influence and integrated to a degree, but with China, not Russia, at its centre. To preclude a Sino-Russian rivalry, the Chinese elite are willing to exercise self-restraint, show deference to Russia’s vision for the region and even let Moscow don the cloak of Eurasian leadership. What really matters is not the appearance of leadership, but rather the reality of power. Letting Russia take the lead could actually work to China’s advantage, especially in areas where it is still weak compared with Russia. The issue of power asymmetry, a critical element feeding Russia’s insecurity towards China, could be turned into something that both countries accept, provided they make good use of their respective strengths.

Chinese thinkers believe that even if Russia is uncomfortable with the power gap, it does not really have any other viable options but to consolidate its relationship with Beijing, especially after Western sanctions have amplified its economic difficulties and reduced its diplomatic space.³² As the BRI connects Asia with Western Europe, Russia risks being isolated if it does not cooperate with China on jointly integrating Eurasia.³³ Without China, Moscow’s ‘Look East’ policy would be inconsequential, no concrete progress having been made with any Asia-Pacific countries other than China. The deepening of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing is the only real achievement of its Asia-Pacific diplomacy.³⁴ Moreover, because it is ‘naturally impossible [for Russia] to rely on its own strength’ to promote the country’s economic revitalisation, according to Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui, deepening bilateral cooperation has become an ‘inevitable choice’.³⁵

Asymmetry does not necessarily play to China’s favour in all domains. China may indeed be stronger than Russia economically and financially, but it is also in a much weaker position from a diplomatic and security perspective. In Central Asia, Chinese analysts recognise that Russia’s overall influence is still ‘far ahead of China’, as Jiao Yiqiang put it.³⁶ China cannot rely solely on its own strength to confront all the local problems that the BRI faces in the region, including ‘complex cultural differences’ and local security challenges.³⁷ In this regard, the Sino-Russian asymmetry does not constitute a problem, but rather creates opportunities, first for complementarity and eventually for rebalancing.

For example, a deeper BRI–GEP alignment would allow China to benefit from Moscow’s entrenched influence in Russian-speaking countries, thus helping to improve its own image.³⁸ Central Asian countries’ remaining concerns could be dispelled, causing them to engage more willingly with China as they realise that the BRI and the GEP are effectively interchangeable.³⁹ The EAEU customs union de facto facilitates custom procedures and eliminates trade barriers for the BRI too. Russia’s military presence can provide a security umbrella and help reduce the risks faced by the BRI in Eurasia.⁴⁰ Closer BRI–GEP coordination could also mean an increased role for China in the region’s security, without creating local alarm. It could even allow China to burnish its ‘responsible big power image’.⁴¹ In addition, growing Sino-Russian security cooperation would address shared challenges such as opposing the ‘three evil forces’ (terrorism, separatism and extremism) and external interference, and preventing colour revolutions.⁴²

Conversely, China’s BRI can provide investments that neither Russia nor Central Asian economies can afford.⁴³ Russia’s cooperation with China will help Moscow not only regain some of its diplomatic space, but also overcome the economic difficulties caused by Western sanctions.⁴⁴ Finally, to alleviate Russia’s possible remaining concerns about China’s economic dominance, Beijing could make sure that Chinese banks are not the exclusive lenders for BRI projects, but rather work with multilateral financing platforms such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.⁴⁵ Ultimately, both countries will benefit as China engages more with Russia on Eurasian political and strategic issues, and as Russia improves its economic situation thanks to China’s BRI.⁴⁶

The alignment of Russia’s GEP and China’s BRI has implications beyond a merely tactical division of labour of the sort that can currently be observed in the post-Soviet space, where Russia dominates the political and security sphere and China the economic one. Beijing is eager to partner with Russia in establishing a Sino-Russian condominium over an economically prosperous and politically stable Eurasia because Chinese strategists see this as the ‘starting point of shaping the future world order’.⁴⁷

Many Chinese experts draw a direct connection between acquiring a dominant position over Eurasia and the reshaping of the world order – a vision that emanates directly from Mackinder’s and Spykman’s works on geopolitics. Variants of Mackinder’s well-known observation that ‘whoever controls the world island rules the world’ can, for example, be found in the writings of Wang Xiaoquan, the secretary-general of the Belt and Road Research Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He advocates a closer Sino-Russian partnership over Eurasia, in particular because ‘whoever can guide the Eurasian process can lead the construction of a new world order’.⁴⁸ Lei Jianfeng, a professor at Renmin University School of International Studies, describes the classic geopolitics theories and draws on the history of the rise of the British Empire to conclude that maintaining a divided Eurasia is ‘the essence of the geopolitical strategy’ of the United Kingdom, Europe and the US. A consolidated China–Russia strategic partnership, on the other hand, would make it more difficult for the US to divide and rule in Eurasia and prevent Washington from simply ‘doing whatever it wants’ in the region. Lei also considers the domination of Eurasia as crucially important in the context of China’s long-term competition with the American hegemon:

The pre-World War Two power competition model that relied on military strength to seek hegemony gradually gave way to a contest of comprehensive national power based on economic strength. The world is increasingly divided into competitions between the European, the East Asian, and the North American economic zones. Only by being able to lead the region’s economic prosperity can we gain the advantage.⁴⁹

Unspoken here is the idea that as Russia’s power recedes, China will come to dominate the entire region.

Chinese thinkers then proceed to speculate about the potential effects of a Sino-Russian condominium over Eurasia on the future reconfiguration of the main regional actors’ respective positions. For example, Li Ziguo, a Russia expert at a think tank affiliated with the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, believes that if the GEP and the BRI combine their strengths, Eurasia could not only become a regional bloc that competes with developed economies, but also increase the rising powers’ ‘economic discursive rights’ in constructing a new international order.⁵⁰ Yang Lei also contends that the alignment of the two initiatives will have a ‘profound impact on the international relations pattern’ whereby a deeper Eurasian integration under Sino-Russian co-leadership will eventually persuade the other three major players in the region – the EU, Japan and India – to shift their focus of cooperation.⁵¹ In particular, the EU’s cooperation with Russia and China will expand, as its ‘sense of independence from the U.S. is constantly on the rise’. EU governments are reluctant to cooperate with Russia’s EAEU because they do not want to accord it legitimacy and thus strengthen Russia’s position, but they generally hold favourable views of the BRI and wish to cooperate with China in order to ‘exert an effective influence on the rule-making process’.⁵² As the GEP and the BRI further overlap, the argument runs, the EU will have no choice but to cooperate with both countries. Similarly, as China and Russia become the main driving forces behind regional integration, Eurasia will become further separated from the US, and Washington will have no choice but to ‘seek coexistence’ with them in order to protect its interests in the region.

***

As both China and Russia have turned their attention to Eurasia and launched elaborate initiatives to expand their influence and reaffirm their primacy, international observers see the continent emerging once again as a potential contested zone. They observe that the two countries’ past competition ended up in a conflict that took three decades to overcome, and assess that their concomitant new-found appetite for regional leadership could test the solidity of their partnership and cause an eventual collision. In this view, the West just needs to sit back patiently, observing the Eurasian chessboard as it becomes the stage for a contest that inexorably embroils and eventually hobbles the two rivals.

Such a scenario, however, is not preordained. If the analysis of Chinese Russia experts is any indication, China and Russia may be able to transform Eurasia into a joint playground instead of a battlefield. The Chinese leadership is well aware of the possibility that a sensitive and insecure Russia could overreact to China’s rising influence in what Moscow regards as its own sphere of influence. In order to preclude conflict, Beijing’s inclination is therefore to play the cooperative card, persuading the Kremlin that China’s thrust into Eurasia actually supports Russia’s goals, focusing on common political, economic and security interests, and letting Moscow claim the role of ‘Greater Eurasia’ leader if it pleases.

As times goes on, problems might emerge in the Sino-Russian relationship. Russia may eventually realise that China poses a profound threat to its interests and ambitions and decide to get serious about competition. But it took the United States nearly a quarter of a century to come to a similar conclusion. Over the medium term, a Sino-Russian condominium over Eurasia will probably continue to take shape.

Russia: Yanukovich asked Putin to use force to save Ukraine

reuters.com

Louis Charbonneau

6-8 minutes

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UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) – Ukraine’s ousted leader Viktor Yanukovich has sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin requesting that he use Russia’s military to restore law and order in Ukraine, Moscow’s U.N. envoy told a stormy meeting of the Security Council on Monday.

Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, shows a letter to the U.N. Security Council in New York purportedly from ousted Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovich to Vladimir Putin asking the Russian leader for military intervention in Ukraine in this still image from UNTV video March 3, 2014. REUTERS/UNTV/Handout via Reuters

“The country has plunged into chaos and anarchy,” Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin read from an unofficial translation of the letter while speaking to reporters after an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. “The country is in the grip of outright terror and violence driven by the West.”

“People are persecuted on political and language grounds,” he read. “In this context, I appeal to the President of Russia Vladimir V. Putin to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to re-establish the rule of law, peace, order, stability and to protect the people of Ukraine.”

Churkin held up a copy of the letter for council members to see during a heated council session in which Western envoys and the Russian ambassador hurled allegations at each other for two and a half hours. He said the letter was dated March 1.

After the Russian ambassador spoke, U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power dismissed Russian claims that Russian-speaking Ukrainians were under threat in the eastern regions of the former Soviet republic.

“There is no evidence that ethnic Russians are in danger,” she told the 15-nation council, which is holding its third emergency session on Ukraine in four days, this time at the request of Russia.

Power said there was “no legal basis” for Russia to justify its military deployments in Ukraine through an invitation from the regional prime minister of the Crimea, adding only Ukraine’s parliament could do that.

“Russia has every right to wish that events in Ukraine had turned out differently,” she said. “But it does not have the right to express that unhappiness by using military force or by trying to convince the world community that up is down and black is white.”

Churkin rejected Power’s denials and said she appeared to have gotten all her information about Ukraine “from U.S. TV”. He repeated Moscow’s view that Yanukovich is Ukraine’s legitimate leader, not interim President Oleksandr Turchynov.

British Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant also rejected Russian allegations of acts of terrorism and threats against ethnic Russians in Ukraine. “It is clear that these claims have simply been fabricated to justify Russian military action,” he said.

He dismissed Yanukovich’s letter to Putin as meaningless.

“We are talking about a former leader who abandoned his office, his capital and his country, whose corrupt governance brought his country to the brink of economic ruin, who suppressed protests against his government, leading to over 80 deaths,” Lyall Grant said.

He added that he would not rule out introducing a resolution on the Ukraine crisis in the coming days.

‘VOICE OF THE PAST’

Despite the sharp exchanges reminiscent of the Cold War, there was no formal outcome of Monday’s meeting. Russia is a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council and, therefore, can block any actions proposed by its members.

Most council members took the floor to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine. China was careful to not rebuke its ally Moscow, which it has supported on issues involving Syria and Iran, but the Chinese envoy did voice support for the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries.

Kiev’s U.N. envoy Yuriy Sergeyev told the council Russia had deployed roughly 16,000 troops from Russian territory to Ukraine’s autonomous region of the Crimea since February 24 , which he said was an illegal invasion. He made clear this was in addition to troops Russia had already deployed to service its Black Sea fleet in the Crimea under an arrangement with Kiev.

Ignoring warnings from U.S. President Barack Obama and other Western leaders, Putin won permission from his parliament on Saturday to use military force in Ukraine. The stated purpose was to protect ethnic Russians after the ouster of Ukraine’s Russian-backed president a week ago.

Putin got the green light from parliament after Russian forces had already gained control of Crimea, an isolated Black Sea peninsula with an ethnic Russian majority and where Moscow has long had a naval base.

French Ambassador Gerard Araud compared Russia’s intervention in Ukraine to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 when Warsaw Pact forces crushed attempts by Prague to relax censorship and implement more lenient policies than previous communist governments there.

“We are hearing the voice of the past,” Araud said. “I was 15 years old when Soviet forces entered Czechoslovakia. It was the same justification.”

The council met on Friday and Saturday to discuss the crisis in eastern Ukraine but took no decisions, as expected. Both meetings highlighted the deep divisions between the United States and other Western nations and Russia, which has a major Black Sea naval base in the Crimea region.

At Friday’s session, Ukraine accused Russia of illegal military incursions onto Ukrainian territory, while U.S. and European delegations warned Moscow to withdraw any new military forces deployed in neighboring Ukraine.

Russia, however, said any military movements by Russian forces there were in compliance with its agreement with Kiev on maintaining its naval base there. On Saturday, the United States called for international observers to be deployed to Ukraine.

Power and other Western envoys reiterated the call for monitors at Monday’s session. Churkin responded by saying he did not necessarily reject the idea of international observers being deployed to Ukraine, though he did not explicitly support the proposal either.

Reporting by Louis Charbonneau; Editing by James Dalgleish, Toni Reinhold